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Posin: Tax Shelters: The Continuing Struggle

TAX SHELTERS:
THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE
Daniel Q. Posin*
One of man's basic instincts is to seek shelter. In prehistoric
times, this instinct was evinced in a desire for refuge from wind,
snow, and rain. 1 But as civilization developed, the instinctive
search for shelter came to include the drive to seek protection from
2
the steeply progressive tax rates of the Internal Revenue Code.
Tax shelters have evolved, over the last several decades, as a
sophisticated technique for attaining this protection. As such they
have recently become a target of those who would "reform" the
federal tax structure. The impetus for reform reached a climax in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (the Act). 3
The Act was a watershed in the field of tax shelters. It promulgated a number of detailed reforms which seemed to foreclose
shelters in all areas except real estate. However, despite the Act's
seemingly definitive treatment of tax shelters, there have been a
surprising number of developments since its enactment. These developments demonstrate that the struggle to resolve how much and
what kind of shelter is to be available is yet to be resolved. To
provide a perspective on these problems, this article will discuss
tax shelters prior to the Act, describe the changes effected by the
Act, and focus in detail on recent problems.
TAx SHELTERS PRIOR TO THE TAx REFORM ACT OF

1976

Briefly stated, tax shelters worked in the following way prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1976:4 A typical tax shelter involved a
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., 1963, University of California at Berkeley; M.A.; J.D., 1967, Yale University; LL.M., 1975,
New York University. This article is an update of a previously published article, by

the author, on tax shelters which was written shortly after the Tax Reform Act of
1976 was passed. See Posin, Tax Shelters: How They Work and the Changes
Wrought by the 1976 Act, 1 REv. TAx. INDIVIDUALS 195 (1977).
1. C. SAGAN, THE DRAGONS OF EDEN (1976).

2. See generally I.R.C. § 1.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
4. For a more extensive description of tax shelters before the Tax Reform Act of
1976 (the Act), see Posin, Tax Shelters: How They Work and the Changes Wrought
by the 1976 Act, 1 REV. TAX. INDIVIDUALS 195, 195-208 (1977).
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limited partnership. Those seeking the shelter were the highbracket limited partners. The general partner put the deal together
and provided the managerial skill for the business. The limited
partnership was an attractive vehicle because the "losses" generated in the business could be passed through to the limited
partners. Moreover, it was generally true that, prior to the Act,
any allocation of overall partnership loss would be upheld, 5 so the
bulk of the losses could be allocated to the high-income limited
partners.
In employing the limited partnership form, two risks had to be
circumvented. First, the Internal Revenue Service might classify
the partnership as a corporation for tax purposes, resulting in loss of
the pass-through of deductions. The Service set forth four characteristics to ascertain whether an entity would be classified as a
partnership or a corporation: centralization of management, con6
tinuity of life, free transferability of interests, and limited liability.
An entity which lacked two of these characteristics was considered
a partnership. 7 Under the regulations' definition of continuity of
life" and free transferability of interests, 9 it was very likely the
well-advised limited partnership would be found to lack those two
characteristics and hence be found to be a limited partnership. 10
The second risk involved in using the partnership form was
5. See Vaughan v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 548 (1934), nonacq. XIV-1 C.B. 40

(1935), rev'd in part and affd in part, 85 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
606 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 421, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4118, 4132. Allocation of particular items of partnership
income or loss, such as capital gains, charitable contributions, and tax credits, was
barred if the "principal purpose" of such allocation was the "avoidance or evasion"
of tax. I.R.C. § 704 (b)(2), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, § 213, 90 Stat. 1520; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) Example 1, T.D. 6175, 1956-1
C.B. 211, as amended by T.D. 6771, 1964-2 C.B. 177. See also Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395 (1970). Retroactive allocation of partnership losses, that is, attributing losses incurred over the year to a partner who purchased his interest late in
the year, was often attempted prior to the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 421, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4118, 4132, but was
probably invalid. See Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1976).
6. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, as amended by
T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553, as further amended by T.D. 7515, 1977-47 I.R.B. 17.

7. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, as amended by
T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553, as further amended by T.D. 7515, 1977-47 I.R.B. 17.
8. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(e), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, as amended by T.D.
6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553, as further amended by T.D. 7515, 1977-47 I.R.B. 17.
9. Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(3), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, as amended by T.D.
6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553, as further amended by T.D. 7515, 1977-47 I.R.B. 17.
10. See, e.g., Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976); Chaffin, 45 T.C.M.
(P-H) T 76,132, at 580 (1976).
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that the limited partnership tax shelter might be disregarded by the
Service if it deemed the transaction to be for the purpose of "tax
avoidance." The tax avoidance or "sham transaction" doctrine stems
from the venerable Gregory v. Helvering," Higgins v. Smith,' 2 and
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.' 3 cases, and is applied to this
area in Revenue Procedure 74-17,'4 which sets forth guidelines
that must be met before the Service will issue a ruling that an entity
will be treated as a limited partnership. The criteria that must be
met for a favorable ruling are: (1) All the general partners must, in
the aggregate, have at least a one percent interest in each material
item of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit;' 5 (2) the
aggregate deduction of the limited partners during the first two
years of the partnership's operations cannot exceed the amount of
the equity investment in the partnership;' 6 and (3) a creditor who
makes a nonrecourse loan to the partnership may not acquire, as a
result of making the loan, any direct or indirect interest in the
profits, capital, or property of the limited partnership, other than
as a secured creditor.' 7 The well-advised limited partnership could
meet these criteria.
Once the limited partnership was set up, the next step was to
establish the limited partners' bases in the partnership. The general rule is that a limited partner's basis in the partnership is the
amount of money he pays plus the adjusted basis of the property
he contributes to the limited partnership.' 8 A partner can deduct
as a loss only an amount equal to the basis in his partnership
share.' 9 Thus the arrangement does not appear particularly promising, since if a limited partner contributes $100,000 in cash and
property to the partnership and loses it all, his maximum tax benefit (assuming he were in the seventy percent bracket and remained
so even after the shelter deductions) would be $70,000-still a net
loss of $30,000.
However, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, it was possible
to increase "artificially" the limited partner's basis by having the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

293 U.S. 465 (1935).
308 U.S. 473 (1940).
324 U.S. 331 (1945).
1974-1 C.B. 438.
Id. at 439.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18.
19.

I.R.C. § 722.
I.R.C. § 704(d), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,

§ 213, 90 Stat. 1520; see also I.R.C. § 165(b).
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partnership take out a nonrecourse loan, secured by the partnership property. Even though the limited partner was not personally
liable on the loan, his basis was increased by a proportion of the
loan equal to the proportion in which the partner shared in the
profits of the partnership. 20 This rule, based on Crane v. Commissioner,2 1 meant that, for example, if eighty or ninety percent of the
partnership's capital were nonrecourse debt secured by partnership
property purchased with the loan proceeds, a partner's basis in the
partnership could be multiplied eight or nine times the amount he
was actually risking in the partnership. 2 2 Such heavily leveraged
nonrecourse financing arrangements were common in the shelter
field.
Given a limited partnership with the limited partners' bases
greatly inflated over the amounts they actually risked in the venture, the stage was set for taking advantage of some large deductions. Tax-shelter limited partnerships before the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 tended to be in those businesses which generated substantial
deductions early in the life of the project. The typical fields were
real estate, 23 oil and gas, 24 equipment leasing, 25 movies, 26 farming,
20.

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).

21.

331 U.S. 1 (1947).

22. For a discussion of the rationale of this rule, see Posin, supra note 4, at
198-99.
23. Real estate yields the major deductions of up to two years of prepaid interest, I.R.C. § 163; see Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76, and property taxes, I.R.C. §
164, during the period the project is being constructed and generating no income,
see I.R.C. § 266; Treas. Reg. § 1.266-1, T.D. 6313, 1958-2 C.B. 114, as amended by
T.D. 6380, 1959-1 C.B. 63. Once the project is operating, deductions of major importance are accelerated depreciation, I.R.C. § 167, computed from a basis which would
include the nonrecourse debt used to finance the project, see Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), as well as interest on the nonrecourse loan.
24. This area provides the unique deduction for intangible drilling and development costs. See I.R.C. § 263(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965). If intangible drilling costs have been paid in a particular year, the deduction for them will be allowed
even though the actual drilling does not occur until the following year. Rev. Rul.
71-252, 1971-1 C.B. 146-47. However, the Service has indicated in a recent letter
ruling that it is reconsidering allowing deduction of these prepaid intangible drilling
costs. IRS Letter Rul. 7805027 (Nov. 3, 1977).
25. The equipment leasing shelter essentially involves the partnership using
nonrecourse debt to purchase equipment (typically aircraft, computers, railroad rolling stock) and then leasing it to a user. The partnership, as owner of the equipment,
will thus enjoy the benefit of deductions for accelerated depreciation, I.R.C. § 167,
additional first-year depreciation I.R.C. § 179, asset depreciation range, Treas. Reg. §
1.167(a)-11, T.D. 7128, 1971-2 C.B. 132, as amended by T.D. 7272, 1978-1 C.B. 82, as
further amended by T.D. 7315, 1974-2 C.B. 69, and on occasion the investment credit, I.R.C. § 46(e)(3), as well as interest on the nonrecourse debt.
26. Movies provided depreciation deduction using the attractive "income fore-
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and sports franchises. 2 7 The large early deductions generated by
these projects would be passed through to the limited partners to
offset their high salary or investment income earned from other
sources.
A tax shelter is like marriage: getting in is fun but getting out
can be painful. After a shelter has operated for a few years and the
bulk of the deductions-whose major effect is early in the life of
the project-has been exploited, it becomes attractive to get out.
However, the accelerated depreciation deductions have dramatically reduced the basis of the property of the project, perhaps well
below its fair market value. Hence the attractive "paper" losses
these deductions generated are likely to be counterbalanced by un28
attractive "paper" gains when the property is eventually sold.
Nevertheless the taxpayer will have benefited from the shelter in
two ways: (1) He will have enjoyed tax deferral for some years; and
(2) the early deductions will have been taken against ordinary intax imposed on getting out may be only at capicome whereas 2the
9
rates.
gains
tal
This ordinary loss-capital gains dichotomy has long enraged tax
reformers. Beginning in the early 1960's, "recapture" provisions
were introduced into the Code, causing some of the gain attributed
to the taking of depreciation to be treated as ordinary gain. The
treatment has varied somewhat over the years, but as matters stood
just before enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, all the gain
on the sale of personal property attributable to the taking of depreciation was taxed at ordinary income rates, 30 whereas the recapture
on sales of real property was somewhat less stringent. On the sale
of commercial real property, such as office buildings and industrial
cast" method. For discussion of the movie tax shelter, see Posin, supra note 4, at 202
n.27.
27. The areas of farming and sports franchising provide, respectively, early deductions for feed costs to the cash method taxpayer and rapid amortization of player
contracts. For further discussion of sports franchises, see note 57 infra.
28. If a partnership interest in a tax shelter is abandoned, that too will trigger
gain. See Millar v. Commissioner, No. 77-1926 (3d Cir. June 12, 1978); Fred H. Lenway & Co. v. Commissioner, [1978] 69 TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 50; text accompanying note 109 infra. Giving away the shelter property will be treated as a sale for
the balance of the nonrecourse loan. Magnolia Dev. Corp., 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 60,177,
at 1032 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2(a)(3) (1972).
29. The sale of such depreciable property would probably be governed by
I.R.C. § 1231; hence if that provision's "netting" process were positive, the transaction would be treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset, pursuant to I.R.C. §§
1221-1222.
30. I.R.C. § 1245.
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plants, the gain recaptured was only the gain attributable to the
excess of accelerated depreciation over straight line. 3 1 On the sale
of residential real property as well, only the excess of accelerated
over straight line depreciation was recaptured; moreover the
amount of recapture was reduced one percentage point for each full
32
month the property was held beyond 100 months.
If the partner sells his limited partnership share before the
partnership sells the partnership property, the recapture rules still
bite. Since the partner will have enjoyed tax losses on the project,
the basis in his partnership share will have been reduced pro
tanto. 33 Thus, there will be a substantial gain on the sale of the
partnership interest. While the sale of a partnership interest usually gives rise to a capital gain, 34 to the extent that the gain is
35
attributable to depreciation recapture, it will be ordinary.
Thus, tax shelters are sophisticated entities constructed by
combining many different areas of the tax law. It is therefore not
surprising that the attack instituted on them by the Act was sophisticated and was made on several different fronts.
CHANGES IN TAX SHELTERS EFFECTED BY THE

TAx REFORM ACT OF 1976

The Act attacked tax shelters on several levels. It tightened
the screws on the use of the limited partnership, although it did
not put that form out of reach of an otherwise viable tax shelter.
After the Act, however, it is more difficult to allocate overall losses
to the high-income limited partners in a manner disproportionate
to their capital contributions to the partnership. 3 6 Such an allocation must now have a "substantial economic effect." 37 An allocation
has a "substantial economic effect" if it affects the partners' share of
the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences, for example, if it would affect the financial (as opposed to
31. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(C)(v) (amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 202, 90 Stat. 1520).
32. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(C)(iii) (amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 202, 90 Stat. 1520).
33. I.R.C. § 705(a)(2)(A).
34. I.R.C. § 741. See Pollack, [1977 Transfer Binder] 69 TAx CT. REP. (CCH)
No. 50, holding that the Corn Products doctrine, see Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), does not apply to the sale of a partnership interest.
35. I.R.C. § 751(a).
36. For a discussion of the treatment of loss allocation prior to the 1976 Act, see
note 5 supra and accompanying text.
37. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2).
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tax) accounts of the partnership and thus have an impact on the
amounts the partners would receive on liquidation. 8 Certain other
changes in the treatment of partnerships were also effected.3 9
The Act's most significant assault on tax shelters was the new
so-called "at risk" rules. They attack the practice of "artificially"
increasing the investor's basis by using nonrecourse debt. Under
amended section 704(d), after January 1, 1976, for purposes of calculating a partner's distributive share of partnership losses, a partner's basis cannot include any part of a partnership debt for which
the partner is not personally liable. 40 Thus even if the partnership
debt were with recourse, that is, if the general partner were liable
on it, the limited partners' bases could not include the debt for the
purpose of ascertaining their distributive shares of partnership losses. This limitation applies only for computing the distributive
share of partnership loss. If the limited partner sells his share or
makes a gift of it, or computes depreciation that does not give rise
to a loss, the basis continues to include a part of partnership debt
on which the partner is not personally liable.
On its face, the statute appears to allow a maneuver for avoiding the bite of the "at risk" rules. Partners could take deductions
arising from depreciation and other sources, reducing their
amounts at risk to zero. Then, the partnership could distribute cash
to the partners. This distribution would not affect the amount at
risk, since it is already zero. The partners could then contribute
the cash received back into the partnership, thereby creating new
amounts at risk which could be used to support further loss deductions. This maneuver is vulnerable to attack under the sham transaction doctrine, but it is unfortunate that the statute must be
38. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAx REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 95 & n.6 (Comm. Print 1976)

(mainly compilation of committee reports). See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2), T.D. 6175,
1956-1 C.B. 211, as amended by T.D. 6771, 1964-2 C.B. 177, which provides some
further examples.
39. Retroactive allocation of partnership losses and income is now prohibited.
See I.R.C. §§ 706(c)(2)(B), 704(a)-(b); note 5 supra. Fees for organizing the partnership, whether paid to partners or outsiders, may, at the election of the partnership,
be amortized over a period of not less than 60 months. I.R.C. § 709(b)(1). Prior law
did not speak to this matter, and there was in general an attempt to deduct currently
organization fees paid to partners. The dollar limit on additional first-year depreciation of I.R.C. § 179 (of use in the equipment leasing shelter, see note 25 supra) now
applies at the partnership level, rather than at the level of the individual partners,
hence drastically limiting the amount of that deduction available to the partners. See
I.R.C. § 179(d)(8).
40. I.R.C. § 704(d), as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 213, 90 Stat. 1520.
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backstopped by a judicial doctrine whose scope is uncertain."1
If the principal activity of the partnership is investing in real
property other than mineral property, the "at risk" limitation does
not apply. 42 Thus, the real estate tax shelter is untouched by the
new "at risk" rules. Moreover, another significant exception is that
section 704(d) does not apply if the activity of the partnership is
movies, oil and gas, equipment leasing, or farming (other major
shelter businesses heretofore); rather these activities are governed
by new section 465. Hence section 704(d) applies to all activities
carried on in partnership form other than real estate and the activities covered by section 465.
Section 465 applies to the motion picture, oil and gas, equipment leasing and farming activities whether or not they are carried
on in partnership form. As to these activities, it provides, analogously to section 704(d), that losses (defined for these purposes as
the excess of deductions over income)43 are allowed only to the
extent that the investor is "at risk" in the activity. 44 The investor is
at risk the amount of money and the adjusted basis of other prop41.

Another possibility is to provide that the cash distribution by the partner-

ship give the partners negative amounts at risk, so that the cash contributions back to
the partnership simply put the partners back at a zero-amount at risk. While this is a
sensible approach, the legislative history specifically provides that the amount at risk
shall not be less than zero. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3483-84. H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 8367 (1978), at this writing passed by the House, would cure
this problem by providing that the taxpayer would recognize income to the extent his
amount at risk is reduced below zero by distributions to him.
42. I.R.C. § 704(d) (last sentence).
43. I.R.C. § 465(d). Thus, analogously to I.R.C. § 704(d), these limitations apply
only for the purpose of calculating operating losses; for other purposes, such as computing gain or loss on sale or exchange, the investor's basis in the property would
include nonrecourse debt. Note also that in computing depreciation, the basis would
include nonrecourse debt. It is only in ascertaining the total amount of deductions in
excess of income allowed that the "at risk" limitations would apply. Thus, if depreciation so computed led to losses in excess of amount at risk, the excess loss would be
disallowed but the basis of the property depreciated would be reduced by the full
amount of the depreciation taken. The excess loss so disallowed could be carried
over and used in subsequent years if the taxpayer puts sufficient additional amounts
at risk. See I.R.C. § 465 (b)(5); see also S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47,
reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3482-83. If the taxpayer sells
the property which has given rise to these carried-over losses, he should be allowed
to use them, since he will have suffered the penalty of a decrease in basis due to the
depreciation which was taken. This approach seems sanctioned by the legislative
history, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 36 n.4. (Comm. Print 1976).
Compare the treatment of the analogous problem under I.R.C. § 704(d) at text accompanying note 41 supra.
44. I.R.C. § 465(a).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/2
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erty contributed to the activity plus certain "amounts borrowed"
with respect to the activity.4 5 The investor is at risk as to "amounts
borrowed" if he is personally liable for repayment of the loan or if
he has pledged property other than property used in the activity as
46
security for the loan.
The statutory scheme and accompanying legislative history
make clear that any indirect arrangement to secure the loan with
the shelter property or otherwise to save the investor from personal liability on the loan will mean that the investor will not be
considered at risk as to such amounts. Thus a nonrecourse loan
directly to the partner secured by the partnership property or by
the partner's share in the limited partnership will not be effective
to increase the amount at risk,4 7 nor will any indirect "crosscollateralization," such as two shelters in which the loan funds con48
tributed to each are secured by the property of the other shelter.
If the investor is protected from personal liability on a loan by
stop-loss, reimbursement, or insurance arrangements, he will not
be considered to be at risk with respect to such a loan.4 9 Nor is the
investor at risk for amounts borrowed, even with personal liability,
from one who has an equity interest in the activity. 50 Technical
rules are provided to ascertain amounts at risk for an investor who
engages in more than one of these activities simultaneously, 5 1 and
45.

I.R.C. § 465(b)(1).

46. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2); see S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3439, 3485-86.
47. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3485-86.
48. See I.R.C. § 465(b)(2); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3486.
49. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3484-86.
50. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3). This section also provides that borrowing with personal
liability from members of the family or entities related to the investor will not put
the investor at risk with respect to such amounts.
51. For an investor not doing business through a partnership, each separate
film, equipment rental property, farm, or oil and gas property is a separate activity.
I.R.C. § 465(c)(2). Amounts at risk with respect to one film cannot be used to pick up
losses incurred on another film venture. Thus, for the investor not doing business in
a partnership, at risk is calculated on a project-by-project method. If the activity is
being undertaken by a limited partnership, all the projects in one of the categories
specified in I.R.C. § 465(c)(2) constitute a single activity. Id.; S. REP. No. 938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3486.
Thus, all the films a partnership engages in constitute one activity and amounts at
risk in one film can be used to pick up losses generated in another film, and so on.
This suggests that a single investor seeking a tax shelter would be well-advised to
form a partnership with another person, who would play a minor role, in order to
take advantage of the more liberal partnership rules for allocating amounts at risk
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for carrying over losses which exceed amounts at risk to subsequent
52
years.
This statutory scheme leaves some distinct crevices. Suppose a
business does not use the partnership form-thus avoiding the "at
risk" limitation of section 704(d)-and it is a business not specified
in section 465, thus avoiding its "at risk" limitations as well. Such
an activity would be, for example, coal mining, or records and
books, where leasing of the property is not involved. It would appear that the investor who does not use the partnership form to
carry on such businesses could successfully employ nonrecourse
53
financing to increase his basis for the purpose of taking losses.
The Act's assault on tax shelters did not stop with these devastating "at risk" rules. It also limited a number of the favorite deductions of the shelter lines of business. Although the real estate
tax shelter survived the "at risk" rules, some of its most important
deductions were severely tightened. Construction period interest
payments and taxes must now be amortized over ten years, commencing when the property is first put into use. 5 4 Prepaid interest
must also now be capitalized and amortized, under regulations to
be prescribed. 55 Certain production costs for films, books, and records, which were currently deductible, must now be capitalized
and amortized. 56 The treatment of player contracts on the sale of a
57
professional sports franchise was tightened.

from project to project. If a partnership engages in more than one line of § 465

business such as equipment leasing and movies, each activity will be treated as
separate, and the amount at risk for each partner will be determined separately for
each activity. Id. at 51 n.9, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3487 n.9. If the
partnership undertakes both a § 465 activity, and a non-section 465 activity which is
covered by I.R.C. § 704(d), the amount at risk in each activity would also be computed separately. H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 399, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4118.

52. See note 43 supra.
53. For an example of such an attempt, see text accompanying notes 88-89
infra.
54. I.R.C. § 189. There is a complex transition rule providing for a four-year
amortization when the property is first put into use, which period gradually increases
to 10 years. See I.R.C. § 189(b). The amortization rule starts to apply to various kinds
of property in various years. Id. For further discussion of this transition rule, see
Posin, supra note 4, at 213-14. The taxpayer, as before the Act, may still elect to
capitalize construction period interest and taxes. I.R.C. §§ 266, 189(a).
55. I.R.C. § 461(g). Points and similar charges will be treated as interest, S.
REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3439, 3541.
56. See I.R.C. § 280.
57. The buyer of a professional sports franchise wants a large amount of his
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The recapture provisions were also tightened. On the sale of
residential real estate, all post-1975 depreciation in excess of
straight line will be recaptured without reference to any holding
period, thus bringing the treatment of residential real estate into
line with commercial real estate. 58 The sale of oil and gas property
will give rise to recapture, at ordinary rates, of gain attributable to
the deduction for intangible drilling and development costs. 5 9 And
on the disposition of a sports franchise, gain attributable to amortization of the player contracts and deductions for losses on the retirement or cutting of players will be recaptured at ordinary income
rates. 60 Also, the new carryover basis rule on death 6 ' effected by
the Act means that the bite of recapture cannot be escaped by a stepup of basis to fair market value if the investor dies while holding
his shelter interest.
Thus, the Act provides a sophisticated and multileveled response to tax shelters. Almost all types of shelters except real estate appear foreclosed; and in real estate some of the rules are
tightened. 6 2 Although these changes might have been expected to
engender some controversy, it is doubtful that anyone expected the
burst of activity that ensued since these changes were enacted.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE ACT

"At Risk"
The most interesting developments since the Act in the shelter
field have involved the "at risk" rules. These developments have
occurred on several fronts.
purchase price allocated to the player contracts, which can be written off relatively

quickly, rather than allocated to the franchise itself which, since it lasts indefinitely,
cannot be written off at all. Under new I.R.C. § 1056, the buyer's allocation of purchase price to player contracts is limited to the seller's adjusted basis in the contracts
plus gain recognized to the seller. I.R.C. § 1056(a). There is also a rebuttable presumption that only 50% of the consideration is allocable to player contracts. I.R.C. §
1056(d).
58. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(B). On the sale of low-income rental housing, less than
100% of accelerated depreciation over straight line may be recaptured, depending on
the holding period. See id.
59. I.R.C. § 1254.
60. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(4).
61. I.R.C. § 1023.
62. In addition to the changes discussed, the bite of the minumum tax in the
shelter area was increased. The minimum tax rate was increased from 10% to 15%
and the exemption was reduced. See I.R.C. § 56. Several items relating to shelters
were added as preferences. I.R.C. § 57.
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Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner
Probably the single most intriguing development has been Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner,63 decided by the Ninth Circuit
about the same time the final touches were being put on the Act.
Franklin involved a sale of a motel to a limited partnership followed by a leaseback of the property to the original owner. The
purchase price was to be paid in installments over ten years, plus a
balloon payment at the end, for which the partnership had no personal liability. The annual rental payments on the leaseback just
equaled the amount of the installment obligations. Thus no money
was changing hands over the ten-year period, yet the partnership
purported to own the property for purposes of depreciation and
interest deductions.
The Ninth Circuit held, following Crane,64 that such an arrangement involving nonrecourse debt could be a valid sale and
therefore support depreciation and interest deductions by the purchaser. However, the court held that in this instance the taxpayer
had Tailed to carry the burden of showing that the nonrecourse
debt did not exceed the fair market value of the property. 65 Where
the nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair market value of the property, the court stated, payments on the principal yield no equity in
the property. 6 6 Since the taxpayer had no equity in the property,
the depreciation deduction would be denied because " 'depreciation is not predicated upon ownership of the property but rather
upon an investment in property.' "67 The interest deduction also
requires that the borrower have an equity in the property. The
nonrecourse debt has no economic significance if it is for an
amount greater than the value of the property securing it, since the
borrower has no motivation to pay off the debt. Hence, since there
was no bona fide indebtedness the interest deduction was disallowed. 6 8 Franklin, therefore, resolved the question left open by
Crane of what would happen if nonrecourse mortgage debt were
used to buy property with a fair market value less than the debt.
Crane and its progeny had held that where the property is worth
63.

544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).

64. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); see text accompanying notes
20-22 supra.
65. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1049 (quoting Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340, 350 (1966)
(citation omitted)) (emphasis in original).
68. See id.
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more than the nonrecourse debt, the nonrecourse debt would support deductions for depreciation and interest because the taxpayer
would have an equity interest in the property and hence have a
motivation to pay off the debt. 6 9 Franklin has now held that where
the nonrecourse mortgage debt is of an amount greater than the
fair market value of the property, the debt will not support deductions for depreciation and interest.
The question might fairly be asked, "Why would a taxpayer
purchase property for nonrecourse mortgage debt in excess of the
fair market value of the property?" The answer appears to be that
the Franklin court was using the concept of fair market value of the
property without regard to the tax considerations. Obviously, no
sane purchaser would pay more for property, whether using nonrecourse debt or not, than the property is worth. But where the
purchaser, because he is in a high tax bracket, can enjoy substantial tax advantages on the purchase of the property, it may be rational for him to pay more than the property is worth in an economic sense.
Indeed, the facts in Franklin suggest that this is what was
going on. Evidence was introduced in the lower court that the
motel property involved had been purchased by the seller the pre70
vious year for about half the selling price to the taxpayer.
Moreover, the property was insured for only about half this selling
price.71
Franklin achieves a result similar to, but by no means identical
with, the results under the "at risk" rules. Under the "at risk"
rules, a nonrecourse liability is still considered part of the basis of
69. See, e.g., Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973), acq. 1976-1 C.B. 1, in
which taxpayer bought property from a seller, leased it to a user and paid for the
purchase by incurring nonrecourse liability to an institutional lender, secured by the

property and an assignment of the lease. Lease payments were made directly to the
lender. Thus, Bolger owned the property via the vehicle of nonrecourse debt, reported the lease payments as income and took the large depreciation and interest
deductions. The Tax Court upheld this arrangement, following Crane, because the
amortization of the mortgage increased taxpayer's equity in the property. See Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-1 C.B. 21; Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1
C.B. 59; see also Hudspeth v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1975); American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
70. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 n.4 (9th Cir.
1976).
71. Id. The Franklin court did not in fact make a substantive finding that the
property had been purchased for more than its economic fair market value. See text
accompanying notes 65-67 supra. Rather the court simply held that the taxpayer had
failed to carry the burden of showing that the purchase price including the nonrecourse debt did not exceed the economic fair market value of the property.
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property for purposes of computing depreciation and interest deductions and ascertaining basis. However, if depreciation and
interest deductions give rise to operating losses in excess of
amounts at risk, such losses will not be allowed (although they may
72
be carried over and allowed if more amounts are put at risk).
Thus, under the "at risk" rules, for purposes of ascertaining basis,
the nonrecourse liability will be included in the basis of the property and the basis will be reduced by the full amounts of depreciation taken. This is not as harsh as the Franklin approach of
disregarding the nonrecourse liability for all purposes, including
computation of depreciation, deduction of interest, and ascertainment of basis, where the amount of the debt exceeds the fair market
value of the property.
Franklin is therefore of great significance. All that is required
to achieve its draconian results is for the Service to assert successfully that the taxpayer has failed to carry his burden of showing
that the nonrecourse liability is not greater than the economic fair
market value of the property. Since tax considerations tend to bid
up the price of real estate shelter property beyond its economic
73
value, the threat Franklin poses looms large indeed.
The Service, never one to procrastinate when a favorable decision is rendered, issued a ruling hard on the heels of Franklin,
applying its rationale to a film tax shelter financed with nonrecourse debt. 74 The film shelter originated in 1974 and thus was
not subject to the new "at risk" rules of section 465 which would
have disregarded the nonrecourse debt for purposes of computing
losses. Employing the same rationale as Franklin and citing it, the
Service said that the nonrecourse note used to purchase the film
would be disregarded in determining depreciation and interest
deductions because the note was for an amount significantly greater
75
than the economic fair market value of the film.
72.

See note 43 supra.

73. Would the Service have the temerity to try to apply Franklin even in areas
where the "at risk" rules do not apply in an attempt to achieve Franklin's harsh
results?
74. Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
75. Id. In connection with this ruling, the Service has recently selected a
number of pre-Act film tax shelter limited partnerships, which had been placed in
suspense, to litigate in accordance with this ruling. After choosing a particular
partnership for litigation, the Service will then bring cases against some partners and
inform the other partners that their returns will remain in suspense until the cases
are resolved, unless the other partners agree to be barred by the new ruling. IR
Manual Supp. 45 0-287 (Aug. 24, 1977).
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The implication of this ruling reaches far beyond film tax shelters originating prior to the Act. After that ruling taxpayers even
outside the Ninth Circuit are faced with the threat of a Franklin
analysis. Clearly, the ruling gives notice that the Service intends to
press the Franklin approach in other types of businesses. Indeed
several months after that ruling, the Service, in another ruling, 76
addressed the purchase of a patent by a corporation for $5,000 plus
a nonrecourse note for $1,995,000 secured by the patent and the
receipts from it. Since the purchase of a patent is not one of the
activities specified in section 465, the "at risk" rules of that section
did not apply. 7 7 Since a partnership was not involved, the "at risk"
rules of section 704(d) did not apply. The Service thus applied the
Franklin approach and held that since the taxpayer had failed to
carry the burden of showing that the fair market value of the patent at least approximated the amount of the nonrecourse note, the
note would be disregarded in ascertaining the taxpayer's cost of the
patent for amortization purposes, and no deduction would be al78
lowed for interest on the note.
Franklin and the Service's rulings in this area raise questions
concerning the relationship among courts, Congress, and the Service. Where Congress has specifically exempted real estate and
certain other activities from the new "at risk" rules, is it appropriate for a court to render a decision like Franklin and for the
Service to press that rationale? It might be answered that the
Franklin approach only applies where the nonrecourse debt is in
excess of the fair market value of the property, whereas the new
"at risk" rules disregard nonrecourse debt, for purposes of computing losses, regardless of the fair market value of the underlying
property. However, it still seems that courts and the Service would
be overreaching in pressing the Franklin analysis in real estate and
other areas in light of Congress' clear purpose to exempt nonrecourse financed real estate and certain other activities from the
'at risk' sort of attack.

76. Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-4 I.R.B. 7.
77. If the patent were licensed out, it might be argued that "equipment leasing" would be involved. See text accompanying note 89 infra. Also, I.R.C. § 465 did
not cover this particular transaction because the taxpayer involved was a corporation.
78. See Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-4 I.R.B. 7. The cost of a patent is amortized over
the life of the patent from the time it is acquired by the taxpayer. Treas. Reg. §
1.167(a)-3, T.D. 6182, 1956-1 C.B. 98, as amended by T.D. 6452, 1960-1 C.B. 127. See
also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 1218 (1975).
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Devices To Limit the Amount at Risk
If the debt involved in a transaction is not for an amount
greater than the fair market value of the property, the arrangement
will not be vulnerable to a Franklin-type attack. However questions can still arise as to whether there is the true personal liability
for the debt which would avoid the "at risk" limitations. As discussed above, the Act and its legislative history make clear that
arrangements which purport to subject the investor to personal liability on the debt, but which in fact stop the investor's loss or
otherwise hold him harmless from personal liability on the debt
will be ineffective to increase the investor's amount at risk. 7 9
Nevertheless "hope springs eternal" 0 and since the Act a number
of such schemes have been tried. All that have been ruled on thus
far have failed.
One of the more ingenious arrangements was a ten-year note
with personal liability which financed eighty percent of the purchase price of a movie project. Fifty percent of the gross receipts
from the movie were to be applied against the note. If at the end
of the ten-year period there was any unpaid balance on the note,
the taxpayer could obtain a loan from a third party to repay it. The
loan was renewable from year to year at the taxpayer's option until
the balance was finally paid from the receipts of the film. The Service ruled that the amount of this liability was not at risk.81 Although the Service gave no reason, undoubtedly it viewed the
arrangement as simply a device to limit the taxpayer's personal
liability.
79. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
80. A. POPE, ESSAY ON MAN 12 (facsimile ed. 1969) (epistle I, line 91) (emphasis deleted).
"Hope" is the thing with feathersThat perches in the soulAnd sings the tune without the wordsAnd never stops-at all ....
E. DICIaNsON, Poem 254, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DIcKINsON (T.
Johnson ed. 1890).

81. See Rev. Rul. 77-398, 1977-44 I.R.B. 8. In two rulings related to this, taxpayer
used debt on which he had no personal liability to finance his business activity. The
debt was secured by taxpayer's business property and guaranteed by'taxpayer's customer. The Service said in both cases that the loan was really to taxpayer's customer
and hence the loan was ineffective to increase taxpayer's basis for the purpose of
calculating operating losses. Rev. Rul. 78-30, 1978-4 I.R.B. 9 (beachfront dredging
engaged in by individual covered by neither § 465 nor § 704(d) of the Code); Rev.
Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B. 130 (film "production service" shelter arising prior to effective date of I.R.C. § 465).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/2

16

Posin: Tax Shelters: The Continuing Struggle

1978]

TAX SHELTERS

Another strategy involved a general partnership engaged in
roadbuilding which used a small downpayment and a nonrecourse
note to finance machinery for the business. In its first taxable year
the partnership sustained a loss which could not be used by the
partners in that year because they did not have sufficient bases in
the partnership under the new "at risk" rules.8 2 To increase the
partners' bases, the partnership, on the last day of its taxable year,
purchased a substantial amount of United States Treasury obligations, financed by a small downpayment and a large note on which
the partners were personally liable. The interest rate on the note
was greater than the rate of return on the Treasury obligations.
The Service held that the recourse loan would be ineffective to
increase the partners' amounts at risk. 83 Clearly, the Service regarded the transaction as a stratagem to circumvent the congressional purpose in the "at risk" area. Although the Service did not
explain its rationale, that the transaction made no sense from an
economic standpoint must have played a major role in its deci84
sion.
Suppose, however, the rate of return on the Treasury obligations had been greater than the interest rate on the note. Or, suppose the partnership had borrowed, with recourse, to finance the
purchase of common stocks on margin, an investment not doomed
to be an economic loss. It would seem to be much harder for the
Service to assert that such transactions would be ineffective to increase the partners' bases,8 5 unless the Service is beginning to fashion a rule that, for section 704(d) purposes, an increase in basis due
to recourse liability must be incurred in the same line of business
as are the losses sought to be deducted. Although this is the approach for section 465 activities, 86 there is nothing in section 704(d)
or its legislative history which would support such an approach un82. I.R.C. § 704(d) applied because roadbuilding is not an activity covered by
I.R.C. § 465, and it is not real estate.
83. See Rev. Rul. 77-401, 1977-44 I.R.B. 10.
84. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) where taxpayer used nonrecourse loans to finance purchase of annuities and took large prepaid interest deductions. The Court barred the deductions on the grounds that the transaction had
no economic substance for taxpayer. This same theme was picked up in Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this
case, see text accompanying notes 63-73 supra. In connection with Knetsch, see
I.R.C. § 264(a)(3). See also Rev. Rul. 78-175, 1978-19 I.R.B. 11, for another unsuccessful attempt to avoid the at risk rules using a grantor trust.
85. Such arrangements look even more plausible, of course, if they are not
undertaken on the last day of the taxpayer's taxable year.
86. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
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der section 704(d). There undoubtedly will be further developments
on this front.
The Reach of "At Risk" Rules
As discussed earlier,8 7 there are some possible crevices in the
statutory "at risk" scheme. While real estate is intentionally excepted from the rules, it might be asked whether certain other
activities might also escape the clutches of "at risk." One valiant
attempt was master recordings. The investor bought, for a downpayment plus a nonrecourse note, a metal master record, used to
make the records bought by the public. The investor then licensed
the record to a record manufacturer. The investor did not use the
partnership form, so section 704(d) was not involved. Since the record was section 1245 property, leasing it would be an activity covered by section 465.88 However, the investor hoped that "licensing" the record would not be considered "leasing" for section 465
purposes. The Service, however, took a broad view of "leasing"
and ruled that it encompassed the licensing arrangement. 89 Thus
the Service is taking an expansive view of what constitutes activities covered by section 465.
The Limited Partnership
While the "at risk" area has witnessed the most involuted developments since the 1976 Act, there has been significant activity
in the limited partnership dimension of tax shelters as well.
As previously noted, 90 where a partnership is the shelter vehicle, the Service may classify the entity as a corporation. The Service's tale of woe in this area, however, borders on the pathetic. The
Service initially promulgated regulations in this area to try to prevent partnerships of professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, from
being classified as corporations, so that these entities would not
enjoy pension and other employee benefits associated with corporations. This effort having failed, 91 the Service was stuck with regu87. See text accompanying note 53 supra.

88. See I.R.C. § 465(c)(1)(C).
89. See Rev. Rul 77-397, 1977-44 I.R.B. 7. See also IR 1921 December 23, 1977

for a similar restrictive treatment of books, lithographs, and musical tapes. H.R. 13511,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 8367 (1978), would explicitly extend the reach

of the "at risk" rules to all activities other than real estate, thus sounding the death
knell for possible shelters in such things as coal mining, books, and lithographic
plates.
90. See text accompanying notes 6-10 supra.
91. In T.I.R. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969) (IRS Technical Information Release), the Service, after a long struggle, finally conceded that professional corporations would be
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lations that generally made it difficult for limited partnerships to be
classified as corporations. 92 The Service did not attempt to revise
these regulations. When the Set'vice then turned to attack limited
partnership tax shelters by classifying them as corporations and
thus denying them the passthrough of large losses, these regulations proved a millstone around the Service's neck. The tax shelter limited partnerships93 were generally classified as partnerships
under these regulations.
The Service, belatedly realizing its problems under its own
regulations, promulgated proposed regulations in January 1977 that
would have made it very likely that the typical tax shelter limited
partnership would be classified as a corporation. 94 The reaction to
these proposed regulations was so unfavorable and swift that thenTreasury Secretary William Simon ordered them withdrawn within
a matter of hours. 9 5 The Service, clearly cowed by these events,
recently issued a Letter Ruling, 96 conceding that a limited partnership which is organized under state law materially corresponding to
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act will be treated as a partnership under these regulations. The only requirements are that the
partnership meet the Service's rules relating to net worth requirements of general partners9 7 and qualify under the guidelines prenot be regarded as a "tax
scribing when the partnership will
98
transaction.
"sham"
or
avoidance"
This controversy is, of course, most relevant to the field of real
estate which is the major area in which limited partnership shelter
activity is possible after the Act. 9 9 There have been other decorporations for tax purposes. See also United States v. Kinter, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1954).

92. See Treasury regulations cited note 10 supra.
93. See id.
94. The proposed regulations provided that an entity which bad two of the
characteristics would be a corporation. See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
Hence an entity would have to lack three of the characteristics to be a partnership.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1977, at A 11, col. 3.
95. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1977, at A 11, col. 3.
96. IRS Letter Rul. 7725067 (Mar. 24, 1977).
97. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735. Where a corporation is sole general partner in a limited partnership tax shelter, as is often the case, the corporation's net
worth must be at least 10% of the total contributions to the partnership. In small
partnerships the requirement is 15%. Id.
98. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
99. President Carter's tax reform proposals would require limited partnerships
other than those engaged in residential real estate to be treated as corporations if
they have more than 15 limited partners. The particular bite of these new rules
would therefore be on the large commercial real estate limited partnerships. President Carter's tax reform proposals would also apply the "at risk" rules to activities
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velopments in the partnership area as well.' 0 0
Large Deductions
Since the Act, the Service has been leaning heavily on various
large deductions, which are an integral part of tax shelters, that
survived the "at risk" rules. The Service has also attacked deductions in arrangements originating prior to the effective date of the
Act. The Service has, by ruling, significantly limited the deductions
for prepaid timber royalties,' 0 ' the deductions using the income
forecast method of depreciation in the movies, records and books
areas,' 0 2 the deductions for movies and films using other methods
of accelerated depreciation, 10 3 the deductions for options to sell
interests in leases on federal lands, ' 0 4 and the amortization of covenants not to compete. 10 5 In addition to these rulings, the Service
also issued final regulations restricting the immediate deduction of
06
advanced royalties for coal or other mineral properties. '
The only time the Service has failed in this area has been
when it was unable to bar deductions in the courts for prepaid feed
expenses on the ground that they "distort income." 10 7 Given the
great taxpayer pressure in this area, it is likely that some of these
other rulings will be attacked in the courts.

undertaken in the corporate form where there are five or fewer shareholders. See
N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1978, § 1 (Main), at 33, col. 1.
100. Rev. Rul. 77-309, 1977-35 I.R.B. 19, Rev. Rul. 77-310, 1977-35 I.R.B. 20,
and Rev. Rul. 77-311, 1977-35 I.R.B. 21, explain how to allocate nonrecourse loans
and partnership losses where one limited partnership is a limited partner in another
limited partnership. The Technical Corrections Bill, H.R. 6715, at this writing pending in the Senate, among its other provisions, would define more explicitly what it
means to be a partnership whose "principal activity" is real estate for purposes of the
§ 704(d) exemption.
101. See Rev. Rul. 77-400, 1977-44 I.R.B. 9.
102. See Rev. Rul. 78-28, 1978-4 I.R.B. 6 (numerator can only include income
actually received by cash basis taxpayer; denominator cannot be less than any nonrecourse debt secured by property and guaranteed by third party). For discussion of
the income forecast method of depreciation, see Posin, supra note 4, at 202.
103. See I.R.S. Letter Rul. 7782004 (Sept. 28, 1977).
104. See Rev. Rul. 77-395, 1977-44 I.R.B. 6.
105. Rev. Rul. 77-403, 1977-44 I.R.B. 11.
106. T.C. 7523, 1978-5 I.R.B. 11. The Service has also promulgated a proposed
regulation that would generally require the computation of the investment credit to
be limited to amounts at risk under the rules of I.R.C. § 465. 42 Fed. Reg. 63,791
(1977) (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.48-8(a)(4)).
107. Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1977) (deduction upheld
on ground that change to any other method of accounting would not lead to different
result). But see Clement v. United States, No. 131-75 (Ct. Cl. July 14, 1978).
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Winding Up the Shelter
Since passage of the Act, the only development in winding up
tax shelters was a maneuver which the Service ruled was ineffective to avoid gain on disposing of a shelter after its large early
deductions had been exhausted. Taxpayer used a grantor trust to
purchase a share of a real estate partnership. Under the grantor
trust rules, the deductions from accelerated depreciation generated
by the partnership were attributed to the taxpayer.' 0 8 When the
major benefit of the depreciation deduction was exhausted and the
venture was beginning to show income, taxpayer renounced his retained powers. Taxpayer's theory was that since the trust was no
longer a grantor trust, by virtue of the renunciation, the income
from the partnership was not properly attributable to him. The
Service ruled, however, that the renunciation was in effect a transfer of the interest in the partnership from taxpayer to the trust.
Gain on that transaction would be computed under the usual rules
for computing gain on the transfer of a partnership interest which
include considering as part of taxpayer's amount realized the elimination of taxpayer's responsibility for partnership liabilities. 10 9
Since taxpayer's basis in the partnership was almost zero, due to
the loss deductions, taxpayer had a substantial taxable gain. 1 1°
Again this ruling illustrates the Service's hard line on shelters after
the Act.
Administrative Attack on Shelters
The Service's bellicose attitude toward shelters is manifested
also in the area of tax return administration. The policy initiated
may well be even more far-reaching in practical effect than the substantive developments. In fiscal 1978, the Service will double the
number of partnership returns it audits, bringing the total to about
three percent of all partnership returns filed. However it will focus
in particular on "abusive" partnerships, identified by such criteria
108.

A grantor trust is a trust the income and losses of which are attributed to

the grantor because of his retained powers to control or revoke the trust. See I.R.C.
§§ 671-679.
109. See I.R.C. §§ 741, 752(d).
110. See Rev. Rul. 77-402, 1977-44 I.R.B. 10. See also Austin v. United States,
461 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1972) (withdrawal from partnership causing liabilities to be
assumed by other partners gives rise to amounts realized in amount of liabilities
assumed); Rev. Rul. 75-194, 1975-1 C.B. 80 (same result for charitable gift of partnership interest where partnership has nonrecourse liabilities outstanding); Rev. Rul.
74-40, 1974-1 C.B. 1959 (same result for nonrecourse liabilities).
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as partnership losses in excess of $25,000, low gross income, an entity formed late in its taxable year, negative capital account or substantial reduction in capital assets, and "mischaracterization" of
payments to partners that should be considered capital items.' 1
The Service will also use computer systems to track partners'
amounts at risk and to integrate examinations of partnerships with
large numbers of partners in different districts."12 Perhaps most
significantly, the Service will communicate with state securities
agencies to help identify novel shelter arrangements. This proce3
dure could presumably give rise to early and unfavorable rulings. 11
H.R. 13511,11 4 at this writing passed by the House, would toughen
the rules regulating partnerships by imposing a penalty on the failure to timely file a partnership return and by extending the statute
of limitations for reporting certain partnership return items.
SUMMING UP

Although high-bracket taxpayers still follow the ancient instinct
to seek refuge from the progressive rates, the areas of reliable shelter are shrinking substantially. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 sent a
shock wave through the shelter field, the ramifications of which are
still being worked out by rulings and court cases. And they are
being worked out almost uniformly adversely to taxpayers. Following the Act and its aftermath, real estate appears to be the only
viable limited partnership tax shelter, and even it has been restricted in significant respects. As to most other kinds of tax shelters, it is raining very hard.
111. IR Manual Supp. 42 G-376 (Dec. 12, 1977); IR 1899 October 26, 1977.
112. Id. The revised partnership form 1065 will require general partners to indicate amounts at risk with respect to each 465 activity engaged in by the partnership. The Service also promulgated temporary regulations detailing transitional rules
for computing partners' amounts at risk for partnerships already in existence prior to
the effective date (January 1, 1977 for calendar year taxpayers) of the "at risk" rules,
T.D. 7504, 1977-39 I.R.B. 9.
113. See, e.g., IR 1899, supra note 111. The Service is also considering seeking
legislation which will allow partnership questions to be litigated at the partnership
level with the result binding on the partners. This would be an improvement over
the present system of putting some partners' returns in suspense while others are
litigated, raising the possibility of having to relitigate identical issues in different
forums.
114. 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. Rc. 8367 (1978).
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